Course Overview

What motivates third parties to intervene in international conflicts? Why do some of them use the carrot-and-stick approach in negotiating settlements, while others focus more on helping disputed sides communicate effectively? Under which conditions can third parties succeed in efforts to end war? Research indicates that most third-party attempts at stopping violent conflict fail. Yet, successful conflict resolution can save lives and prevent much suffering. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look for ways in which intermediaries can help disputed parties reach peaceful settlements, or sometimes even prevent deadly conflict from occurring in the first place.

This course surveys major topics in the study of international conflict management, including mediation, military and economic coercion, military intervention, peacekeeping, and inaction.

Main goals:

1. To emphasize the diverse nature of international disputes and the variety of techniques third parties use in managing such conflicts;
2. To assess the motives and goals of third parties in conflict management;
3. To develop a framework through which we can identify why some interventions succeed and others fail.

Course Requirements and Method of Evaluation

Grades will be based on a midterm examination (40%), a 10-12 page final paper (40%), and participation in class discussions (20%).

The midterm exam can be completed by choosing one of the following two options:

1. A take-home essay exam (questions will be distributed by midnight, March 23, and completed exams will be due by midnight, March 25); or
2. An in-class exam on March 28 consisting of identification (ID) questions and short-essay questions requiring answers of 3-5 paragraphs.

To complete the final paper requirement, students will select an international dispute in which third parties were present and critically assess, in the context of the theories learned in class, why the attempted
intervention succeeded or failed. Alternatively, students may choose a conflict in which no intervention occurred and analyze why no third party became involved.

This course is structured as a seminar. For this reason, it is crucial that students keep up with the weekly reading assignments, which are the basis for class discussion. Everyone is expected to complete the readings and attend class prepared to engage in discussion based on the assigned material.

Students needing special accommodations to enable full participation in the course should contact me as early as possible. All information will remain confidential. You may also contact the McBurney Disability Resource Center, 1305 Linden Drive, (608) 263-2741 regarding questions about campus policies and services.

Readings

Students should purchase the following books:


Excerpts from the following books, as well as other readings, are accessible through the course website at https://learnuw.wisc.edu:


Schedule of Classes and Readings

Introduction (Jan. 25)

- Course Overview and Expectations

Conflict and Third-Party Intervention (Feb. 1, 8)

- Conflict as Strategic Behavior
  - Schelling, pp. 3-161.

- The Inefficiency of War
• Intervention as a Conflict Management Tool
  – Princen, pp. 3-17.
  – De Maio, chs. 1-4

Nonintervention (Feb. 15)

• Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust
  – Power, preface, chs. 1-3.

• The Genocide Convention
  – Power, chs. 4-5.

Types of Third Parties and Intervention Strategies (Feb. 22, 29, March 7)

• Mediation: States, Organizations and Individuals

• Military and Economic Coercion: States and Organizations

• Peacekeeping: States and Organizations
Why Intervene? The Case of Africa (March 14, 21)

- Somalia
  - De Maio, ch. 6

- Rwanda
  - Power, ch. 10

- Sudan
  - De Maio, ch. 7

TAKE-HOME MIDTERM EXAM (Option 1): March 23-25

IN-CLASS MIDTERM EXAM (Option 2): March 28

What Determines the Outcomes of Third-Party Intervention? (April 11, 18)

- Defining Success and Failure

- Characteristics of the Third Party and Its Intervention Strategy
  - De Maio, Ch. 9.
• Characteristics of the Dispute and the Warring Parties

**Case Studies in the Success and Failure of Intervention (April 25, May 2)**

• Bosnia

• Kosovo and Libya

**Conclusion and Reflections (May 9)**

• Review and Policy Implications