Basic Information

Meeting Time  Wednesday, 1:20 pm to 3:15 pm
Meeting Place  7121 Hellen C. White Hall
   My Office   322C North Hall
   My Phone    608-263-2024
   My Email    kydd@wisc.edu
   Office Hours Tuesday 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm or by appointment

Overview

The purpose of this course is to survey applications of game theory to international relations and further develop students’ game theoretic modeling skills. Students should have some familiarity with both game theory and international relations theory. The course is organized loosely by substantive topic.

Requirements

In order to expose students to a broad range of work, there are a fair number of readings per week. You should read all of them at the level of attention that you would for a field seminar. That is, you should know the topic, basic argument, basic setup of the model, main results, and have some thoughts
about strengths and weaknesses of the analysis, how it fits into the literature, the extent to which it advances our understanding of the topic, etc.

In addition you must select one article each week that you will pay particular attention to. Try to follow or replicate the solution to the model as best you can. In each class, we will sign up for the next week’s readings, in an effort to ensure that every article gets some coverage by an intense reader.

Students will also be required to complete a research paper for the course. The paper should take a problem of interest to the student and develop a model of it. A good ideal to strive for is the kind of model paper found in *International Organization*, where the problem is well defined and grounded in the empirical and non-formal literature and the model is relatively simple and used to provide theoretical and substantive insights. However, students should feel free to be as technically advanced as they feel comfortable, so long as there is a theoretical and potentially empirical payoff to the exercise.

Students will turn in two preliminary drafts and then the final paper.

• First is a research proposal which will include a statement of the topic and question to be addressed, along with a brief literature review. This will eventually become the introduction to the paper. This will be due in class in Week 6.

• Second is the set up of the model. This will include the enumeration of players, description of the game tree or strategy space, utility functions for the players and information structure of the game. This will be due in class in Week 10.

• Third is the final paper. This will solve the model and discuss the results. This will be due at noon in my mailbox on May 16th. Length is not crucial, but shoot for 8–10 thousand words.

The proposal and model setup may be resubmitted once after responding to my comments.

All written material must have a title page resembling that usually found on an article manuscript to be circulated for a seminar. It must have your name, class identification, date, and a title that informs the reader of both the topic and what stage it is, for instance; Paper Proposal, Model Setup or Final Draft. The body must be double spaced with page numbers and citations using the author date system with a reference list at the back. Turn in a hard copy to my mailbox or in class, stapled. Use of LaTeX is encouraged but optional.
The grade will be determined as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grading Scheme</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Class Participation</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper Proposal</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model Setup</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Paper</td>
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Readings

The one required book is


Most of the rest of the readings are articles, almost all of which are on JSTOR, anything else I will provide electronically. The readings for each week are divided into two sections. Required readings are obviously required. Background readings are a mixture of earlier material that you should have already read or should read now to catch up, and later material that take the ideas of the week further and are optional.

Some other readings may be useful to help familiarize yourself with the approach and debates surrounding it.


- Ten years earlier, *World Politics* published a symposium on rational deterrence theory.

Schedule

Week 1 (January 25) What States Want

Required


Background


1 Cooperation

Week 2 (February 1) Cooperation Theory

Required


Background


## 2 On War

Week 3 (February 8) Arms Competition and War

**Required**


**Background**

Week 4 (February 15) Bargaining and War

Required


Background

- James D. Fearon. Bargaining over objects that influence future bargaining power. 1996

Week 5 (February 22) More on Information and War

Required


Week 6 (February 29) War Fighting, War Termination

**Required**


• James D. Fearon. Fighting rather than bargaining

**Background**


### 3 Multilateral Politics

**Week 7 (March 7) Collective Action and Hegemony**

**Required**


Background


Week 8 (March 14) International Institutions

Required


Week 9 (March 21) Shared Uncertainty

Required


• Avidit R. Acharya and Kristopher W. Ramsay. The calculus of the security dilemma. 2011

Background


Week 10 (March 28) Alliances and the Balance of Power


Background

Week 11 (April 4) Spring Break

Week 12 (April 11) Mediation and Intervention

Required


Background


4 Domestic Politics and IR

Week 13 (April 18) Two Level Games

Required


Background


Week 14 (April 25) Signaling and Audience Costs

Required


Background


Week 15 (May 2) Democracy and War

Required


Background


5  EITM

Week 16 (May 9) Connecting with Statistical Work

Required


Background